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I n t e r p r e t in g  P ro c y c l ic a l  P r o d u c t iv i ty :  Evidence  
f rom  a C ro s s -N a t io n  C r o s s - In d u s t r y  Pa ne l *
Robert J. Waldmann 
European University Institute 
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J. Bradford De Long 
NBER and Harvard University 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.SA.
December, 1991
We use an international panel data set of value added by 
industry to see if labor productivity is procyclical in response 
to demand shocks. It is: holding fixed our proxy for supply-side 
factors—the value added levels of an industry in other 
nations—industry-level productivity rises when value added in 
the rest of manufacturing rises.
Moreover, increases in unemployment are associated with a 
lowered degree of procyclicality in the U.S. and with 
heightened procyclicality in Europe. This suggests that 
procyclical productivity arises primarily from “labor hoarding” 
by firms in the U.S. that wish to avoid future training costs and 
primarily from “job hoarding” by workers in Europe who wish 
to avoid unemployment.
*We would like to thank Hoang Quan Vu for research assistance, the European University Institute 
and the National Science Foundation for research support, and Olivier Blanchard, Richard Freeman, 





















































































































































































I. I n t r odu c t i on
Labor productivity is procyclical, rising in business expansions and falling in recessions 
(see Hultgren, 1960; Okun, 1962). A standard view of procyclical productivity sees it as a 
consequence, not a cause of changes in activity. Labor productivity falls when output falls 
because firms retain more workers than required to produce low current output. They do this 
to avoid the costs of laying workers off now and hiring replacements when activity recovers.1 
Procyclical productivity does not cause but results from business cycles, because firms 
“value the match” with their employees.2
This account has recently been challenged by real business cycle theories. Such theories 
assert that shocks driving the business cycle are not shocks to demand, but are instead 
technology-driven shocks to productivity in particular industries (for example, Kydland and 
Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 1983). Such industry-specific technology shocks directly 
cause an increase in production in the affected industry. They cause increased production in 
other industries by (i) increasing the wealth of consumers, (ii) increasing demand for 
intermediate inputs used in the direcdy affected industry, and (iii) increasing demand for 
(gross) complements of the output of the directly affected industry.
Such theories have been criticized on the grounds that they cannot account for 
correlations in productivity (Summers, 1986) though they might account for correlations in 
output across industries. Demand spillovers from positive technology shocks in one industry 
should lead to reduced labor productivity in other industries.3 But production and 
productivity are positively correlated across industries. Some have made the assumption that 
supply-side shocks are industry-specific while demand shocks are aggregate. They have 
regressed productivity in an industry on total productivity or production to show that demand 
shifts—not shifts in supply—underlies procyclical productivity.4
’See Holt et al. (1960), Oi (1962), and Okun (1962).
2This literature is reviewed by Fair (1969), Hamermesh (1976), and Nickel (1986).
3Under the assumption that the short run marginal product of labor is decreasing.
4See Hall (1986); Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Caballero and Lyons (1989 and 1990); and 
Shapiro (1987). These studies place the measured Solow residual on the left hand side of their 




























































































This, however, is not a convincing refutation of supply-side theories. There are supply- 
side shocks that affect labor productivity in many industries at once: the oil price shocks of 
1973 and 1979, for example. Such shocks generate procyclical productivity in many 
industries: producers shift away from the now-expensive factor of energy and use labor more 
intensively. A real business cycle-driven response of economies to oil shocks creates 
aggregate movements in productivity and output. Economists assuming that “supply” is 
industry-specific and “demand” aggregate would falsely interpret such movements as 
evidence that procyclical productivity was demand-driven.
This paper disentangles demand- and supply-driven components of procyclical 
productivity without making the possibly dangerous assumption that everything aggregate is 
demand. Cost shocks—like the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979—directly affecting productivity 
in many industries also affect many nations. A cross-industry cross-nation panel of data on 
value added by industry can be used to separate the effects of demand and supply shocks.5
Industrial value added shifts correlated with value added shifts in other industries in the 
same economy, and yet not correlated with industrial value added shifts in other nations, are 
candidates for the label “demand.” Industrial value added shifts correlated with value added 
shifts in the same industry in other nations, but not correlated with value added shifts in other 
industries in the same country, are candidates for the label “supply.” The effects of 
idiosyncratic national aggregate demand shocks can be determined because such shocks are 
both intersectoral and nation-specific.
Needless to say, we do not believe that “supply” shifts caused by technology or even 
changes in prices diffuse instantlyacross the nations of our sample. However, we do believe 
that such shifts spread over the countries in our sample within a few years. We believe it is 
important to control for such supply shifts before concluding that procyclical productivity is 
demand-driven.
We are concerned that much of the evidence on procyclical productivity is driven by 
relatively low-frequency changes in productivity and output growth—which was high in the 
1960’s, low during a period from the early 1970’s to the early 1980’s, and moderate through




























































































the mid-1980’s. Such low-frequency changes might well be supply- rather than demand- 
driven. We do not believe that supply-side effects will be adequately removed by using 
instruments, for example U.S. military spending, that while not causally related to supply 
factors nevertheless have much of their own variance produced by low-frequency 
movements.
The identifying assumptions we require are relatively minor. One need not assume that 
technological progress is uniform across countries. One need only assume that there are no 
technological or other supply-side shocks that are (a) specific to a single country yet (b) 
affect a broad range of industries within manufacturing.6
We find that even after controlling for industry-specific cross-nation shocks, sectoral 
productivity growth remains positively correlated with aggregate manufacturing output. This 
suggests that increased aggregate demand leads to increased labor productivity, and that there 
is a component of procyclical productivity to be accounted for by an old-fashioned 
Keynesian “labor hoarding” story, or by some other model in which firms and workers value 
their match.
We go on to investigate the cross-nation pattern of procyclical productivity. If firm-side 
labor hoarding—due to workforce finding and training costs—is important, productivity 
should be more procyclical when unemployment is low.7 When unemployment is high, laid 
off workers are less likely to find new jobs, are more likely to still be available when the firm 
wishes to recall them, and so the incentives for the firm to engage in labor hoarding are 
diminished.
If worker-side job hoarding—firing costs that firms bear in when workers are laid off but 
avoid when workers voluntarily quit—is important, then productivity should be more 
procyclical when unemployment is high: workers will then resist dismissals with more
6We use labor productivity and not total factor productivity as a dependent variable, and so our 
results on procyclical productivity cannot be attributed to market power. Our calculations are not 
affected by deviations of prices from marginal products.
7In the United States, labor productivity appears less procyclical in highly unionized industries (see 
Medoff, 1979; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). This might arise because unionized workers share rents, 
would be likely to suffer a cut in wages if they took jobs in non-union establishments, and so wait to 
be around. Thus the firm is free to lay them off temporarily when demand is momentarily slack 




























































































determination, quits will be rare, and restrictions on layoffs may bind more when 
unemployment is high.8
If procyclical labor productivity is simply a consequence of increasing returns to scale, 
the procyclicality of production should be unaffected by the level of the unemployment rate.
We find that in the United States labor productivity is less procyclical when 
unemployment is high. In Germany and—less strongly—in Britain and in Europe as a whole, 
however, productivity is more procyclical when unemployment is high. There are differences 
between the U.S. and Europe in sign and strength of the relation between the degree of 
procyclicality in productivity and unemployment.
This difference suggests that demand-driven procyclical productivity may spring more 
from labor hoarding in the United States and more from job hoarding in Europe.9 The 
dependence of the cyclical behavior of productivity in these nations on labor market 
conditions raises the possibility that procyclical productivity arises from national institutions 
that mold the dynamic relationships between workers and firms, and is not simply the result 
of an increasing returns to scale technology.
After this introductory section, section II describes the data used in this paper. Section III 
presents the evidence on the existence of procyclical productivity in response to demand 
shocks. Section IV correlates the degree of procyclical productivity with the unemployment 
rate. It leads to the tentative conclusion that “worker hoarding” by firms is relatively more 
important as a cause of procyclical productivity in response to demand shocks in the United 
States, while “job hoarding” by workers is relatively more important as a cause of procyclical 
productivity in response to demand shocks in Germany and perhaps in Britain. Section V 
concludes.
®See Blanchard and Summers (1986), Bentolila and Bertola 0990), and Krugman (1988).
9Abraham and Houseman (1989) use a panel of ten matched U.S. and German manufacturing 
industries, and find that the immediate effect of a reduction in shipments on employment is much 
smaller than Germany. They interpret their findings as implying that German firms, because of 
worker "job hoarding," are less free in the short run to use layoffs to adjust unemployment. They also 
find that the workforce adjustment process was slower in Germany after 1972. In 1972 German legal 
restrictions on layoffs were significantly strengthened by the Works Constitution Act, and the post- 
1972 period has seen higher unemployment. Abraham and Houseman, however, are unable to 
control for changes in technology and costs—particularly the cost of oil—and are forced to assume 
that production is exogenous. Our broader panel of countries should make it possible to control for 




























































































I I .  An I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n t e r s e c t o r a l  P a ne l  of  V a l u e  Added  by 
I ndust ry
We use the OECD International Sectoral Data Bank as our primary data source (Meyer- 
zu-Schlochtem, 1986). Our data set contains annual data on real value added, employment, 
and capital by industry for fourteen OECD nations from 1960 to 1986. Since our approach 
requires a balanced panel and we strongly desire sample of long length, we are forced to 
focus on seven nations for which data on real value added are available from the 1960’s 
onward—Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.10 Data are available for seven ISIC industries within the manufacturing sector: food, 
textiles, paper, chemicals, non-metallic minerals (i.e., stone, clay, and glass), basic metal 
production, and mechanical equipment. Oservations are complete from 1962 to 1985.
The OECD international sectoral database includes employment by industry, but it does 
not include average hours worked by industry. We augment the data by multiplying 
employment by average hours worked in manufacturing.11 This procedure assumes a perfect 
correlation between average hours worked in different industries. Thus it induces positively 
correlated measurement error between total hours worked in different industries.
Since hours are correlated with value added, this measurement error induces a negative 
correlation between value added per man-hour in one industry and in another. The use of 
average hours in manufacturing, instead of average hours in each industry, biases the data 
against revealing procyclical labor productivity.12
10Netherlands data are also available for the 1960's. Unfortunately a change in definitions in 1970 
makes Dutch data from the 1960's incomparable to data from 1970 on.
^Unpublished data were kindly provided by Robert Gordon.
12An additional data problem is posed by the fact that labor productivity data are not available 
whenever value added data are available. Oddly, the OECD does not report total manufacturing 
employment in the U.S.A. before 1968. The ISIC classifications used by the OECD do not correspond 
exactly to SIC classifications, and so comparable data cannot be added from B.L.S. sources. The OECD 
does, however, provide data on wage and salary employment in U.S. industries for the 1960's. Fitted 
values from a regression of total employment on wage and salary employment were therefore used as 
a proxy for total employment. The R2 of these regressions ranges from 99.5% to 99.9%. We conclude 




























































































We do not possess data on average hours worked in Finland. Reported average hours 
worked can be found in the I.L.O.’s Labor Statistics Yearbook, but reported average hours 
from this source show a large increase from 38.5 hours per week in 1978 to 41 hours per 
week in 1979. This shift is large relative to other variation, and we believe it reflects a change 
in coverage. Finland, therefore, was excluded from all regressions that required average 
hours worked.
In addition, data on employment in basic metals and in equipment are not available for 
France or Belgium in the 1960’s. Regressions using these industries as dependent variables 
therefore use data since 1970 only.
I I I .  P r o cy c l i c a l  P r o d u c t iv i t y  and Aggrega te  Demand
Nation-Specific Aggregate Demand Movements
It is fruitless to try to use nation-specific movements in manufacturing value added to 
identify demand-driven movements in productivity unless such movements exist. Stockman 
(1988) has already used an international intersectoral panel to identify demand and supply- 
specific movements in output. Stockman assumed that all industries have the same cyclical 
responsiveness to shifts in aggregate demand—that, in the language of finance, all have the 
same pj with respect to aggregate output—and that all countries have the same
Yiresponsiveness to international supply shocks.13 In spite of these restrictive assumptions on 
the form of his nation- and industry-specific components, Stockman found that 12.2 percent 
of variance of industry value added is accounted for by nation-specific components 
orthogonal to industry-specific value added movements, and that 14 percent of variance is 
accounted for by industry-specific components orthogonal to nation-specific output 
movements.
13Another possibly dubious assumption. For example, the United States imposed oil price controls 
after the 1973 oil shock, and so the real price of oil in the U.S. did not rise as much as in other nations. 
We would be surprised if substitution away from intensive use of energy proceeded as fast in the U.S. 




























































































Waldmann (1989 and 1991), using the OECD database, estimated nation and industry 
effects without imposing the assumption that P, and Yi coefficients were constant across
industries. He found that orthogonal nation effects account for 17 percent of variance in real 
value added, while orthogonal industry effects account for only 9.5 percent of variance. He 
also found that orthogonal nation effects accounted for a very small fraction of the variancein 
real value added in small open economies such as Belgium and Finland. Results from 
Waldmann (1991) are reproduced as table 1.
Tab le  1
Share of  Indus t ry  Va lue Added Growth  Va r ia nc e  Accounted  f o r  
by Orthogonal  Country and Indu s t r y  E f f e c t s
USA Peu Eta flfil Eio Nor UK Average Ratio
Food Country 0.030 0.198 0.183 0.072 0.152 0.048 0.338 0.101 2.267
Industry 0.062 0.032 0.031 0.027 0.040 0.029 0.219 0.044
Textiles Country 0.389 0.207 0.093 0.071 0.291 0.034 0.693 0.248 5.075
Industry 0.007 0.002 0.057 0.129 0.029 0.053 0.003 0.050
Paper Country 0.240 0.213 0.161 0.003 0.186 0.042 0.124 0.147 1.157
Industry 0.021 0.049 0.011 0.177 0.288 0.137 0.108 0.127
Chemicals Country 0.169 0.022 0.025 0.137 0.062 0.023 0.182 0.091 0.521
Industry 0.096 0.376 0.210 0.002 0.320 0.168 0.082 0.174
Stone, Clay, and Country 0.589 0.112 0.038 0.048 0.312 0.052 0.257 0.214 3.456
Glass Industry 0.035 0.097 0.150 0.056 0.002 0.063 0.040 0.062
Basic Metals Country 0.258 0.095 0.099 0.076 0.021 0.004 0.279 0.126 1.266
Industry 0.076 0.017 0.109 0.225 0.094 0.147 0.014 0.099
Mechanical Equip­ Country 0.730 0.276 0.303 0.109 0.025 0.009 0.218 0.295 5.698
ment Industry 0.038 0.039 0.020 0.106 0.002 0.121 0.063 0.095
Average Country 0.375 0.137 0.109 0.083 0.121 0.022 0.292 0.170 1.789
Industry 0.056 0.118 0.097 0.099 0.130 0.118 0.049 0.095
The divergence of the strength of nation-specific movements in manufacturing value 
added leads us to anticipate that our attempts to identify demand-driven procyclical 
productivity will have almost no power in small open economies like Belgium, Finland, and 
Norway. Such economies do not possess an idiosyncratic, nation-specific business cycle of 




























































































larger countries leads us to anticipate that our procedures will have considerable power for 
large countries—the polar case of the United States, and also France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom—where spillovers of demand shocks are smaller, and where there is moreof 
a nation-specific business cycle.14 
Initial Regressions
The growth of value added per man-hour for industry i in nation n was regressed on the 
growth of value added of the rest of manufacturing in nation n, and on the average growth of 
production per man-hour in industry i in other countries, as described in equation 1:
(1) A(log(Y/Nin,)) =cni+ Pni[A(log(Ym-Yint))]+YnilA(log(Y/Ni(.n)t))] + eint
where Y/N denotes value added per man-hour; subscripts i, n, and t run over industries, 
nations, and years, respectively; Ym refers to value added in all of manufacturing in country
n in year t; YnrYint denotes value added in manufacturing in country n in year t in all 
industries except industry i; and a subscript (-n) denote averages over the other countries in 
the sample (i.e., excluding country n) for an industry i. Results from estimating equation 1 
are reported in tables 2 through 4.
Table 2 reports the P coefficients, which measure the sensitivity of industry-level value 
added per man hour to movements in value added in the rest of manufacturing in the same 
nation (holding constant value added in that particular industry in other nations). The p 
coefficients on the growth of manufacturing are generally positive. The precision-weighted 
average is positive for all nations. It ranges horn 0.079 in the U.S. to 0.1S3 in the U.K.. Each 
one percent increase in value added in the other manufacturing industries in the U.S. is 
associated with an increase in labor productivity in each industry that averages .079 percent
14lt would not be appropriate to draw the conclusion that aggregate demand shocks account for 
twice as much of the variance in the typical industry's value added growth rate as supply shocks. 
Undoubtedly, most of both supply- and demand-side shocks are left unidentified by our procedures. 
We wish only to maintain that the 17 percent of industry value added growth rate variance that is (a) 
correlated with changes in the rest of manufacturing production in the same country while (b) 
orthogonal to changes in value added in the same industry in other countries is not "supply." 
(Conversely, the 9.5 percent of industry value added growth rate variance that is (c) correlated with 
changes in value added in the same industry in other countries but (d) orthogonal to changes in the 




























































































above what would be expected, given value added growth in that particular industry in other 
nations. The precision-weighted average across countries of P coefficients for a given 
industry vary strikingly, ranging from -.006 for food products to 0.259 for non-metallic 
minerals. The summary precision-weighted average of all coefficients on the growth of the 
rest of manufacturing in the same country is 0.106.
Tab l e  2
p C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  V a lu e  Added per  M a n - H o u r  R egr ess ed  on the  
G row th  of  Man uf ac tu r in g  In the Same Country
Observations
USA Peu Era fis t UK Average
Food 22 -0.100 -0.042 0.172 -0.033 0.363 0.024 -0.006
(0.127) (0.068) (0.226) (0.123) (0.333) (0.076) (0.047)
Textiles 22 0.011 -0.093 0.338 0.249 -0.025 0.292 0.093
(0.123) (0.163) (0.213) (0.234) (0.262) (0.185) (0.073)
Paper 22 0.048 0.224 0.186 -0.097 0.117 0.495 0.181
(0.166) (0.131) (0.294) (0.195) (0.244) (0.172) (0.074)
Chemicals 22 0.017 0.078 ■0.077 0.860 0.465 0.247 0.127
(0.151) (0.238) (0.229) (0.411) (0.358) (0.214) (0.093)
Stone, Clay 22 0.201 0.290 0.479 0.393 -0.292 0.345 0.259
and Glass (0.103) (0.122) (0.242) (0.267) (0.357) (0.206) (0.067)
Basic 14 0.526 -0.228 -0.346 0.091 -0.216 0.288 0.025
Metals (0 445) (0.440) (0.422) (0.345) (0.877) (0.651) (0.189)
Mechanical 14 0.330 0.137 -0.130 0.169 0.113 0.147 0.142
Equipment (0.213) (0.113) (0.283) (0.273) (0.191) (0.191) (0.074)
Average 0.079 0-088 0.150 0.088 0.107 0.153 0.106
(0 055) (0.050) (0.096) (0.081) (0.109) (0.057) (0.027)
SUR estimate- 0.036 0.085 0.332 0.077 0.203 0.117 0.127
(0.079) (0.069) (0.084) (0.089) (0.152) (0.066) (0.033)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions control lor average productivity growth in the same industry in other countries.
•Equation for 5 industries estimated by SUR, restricting p to be the same in each industry. Regression does not use data 




























































































Under the assumption that the disturbance terms for different industries are independent, 
standard errors for the precision-weighted averages within industries and within nations of 
the P coefficients were calculated and are reported in table 2. For example, the calculated 
standard error of the weighted average of all the p coefficients is only 0.027, giving a t- 
statistic of 3.92. However as is shown below this assumption is not valid. Instead, seemingly- 
unrelated-regressions procedures were used to test the null hypothesis that labor productivity 
is not procyclical when controlling for value added growth in the same industry in other 
countries. Data on different industries were stacked, and equation 1 was reestimated with the 
P coefficient restricted to be the same in different industries.15
Table 2 also reports seemingly-unrelated-regressions estimated coefficients on the 
growth of the rest of manufacturing in the same country. The coefficients are all positive and 
are similar to the precision weighted national average OLS estimated P coefficients. Their 
rank order is almost unchanged. All coefficients, save that of France, are within one standard 
error of the precision weighted national average coefficients. The reported standard errors are 
somewhat larger for the SUR estimates.16
The disturbances in different countries are nearly orthogonal by construction, because 
international averages of productivity growth in the same industry in the other countries are 
included in the regressions. Therefore a standard error can be calculated for the grand 
precision weighted average of the SUR P coefficients estimated for each nation. The grand 
precision-weighted average is 0.127, with a standard error of 0.033. Labor productivity thus 
remains procyclical after controlling for the average rates of industry productivity growth in 
different countries.
15Unfortunately, when seemingly-unrelated-regressions is used and international averages are 
included the sample contains only those years in which all industries in all countries report data. The 
absence of data from the 1960's on employment in the basic metals and metal equipment industries in 
France and Belgium leaves only 5 industries in 6 countries.
16Since the true standard errors must be smaller, this implies that the reported standard errors of the 




























































































Tab le  3
C o e f f i c i e n t s  of  V a lu e  Added per  M a n - H o u r  on the  G r o w t h  of
the Same Indus try  In O th er  Count r ies
Precision-Weighted
USA Peu Eta Bfll Nor UK Averane
Food 0.278 0.282 0.694 0.647 -0.631 0.097 0 244
(0.618) (0.282) (0.688) (0.471) (0.832) (0.268) (0.164)
Textiles 0.292 0.325 0.728 0.423 0.347 0.619 0.445
(0.424) (0.398) (0.457) (0.635) (0.536) (0.513) (0.195)
Paper 0.744 0.667 0.039 0.331 0.946 1.086 0.637
(0.511) (0.275) (0.466) (0.406) (0.441) (0.449) (0.163)
Chemicals 0.391 0.999 0.761 0.023 0.794 0.938 0.720
(0.303) (0.345) (0.258) (0.648) (0.426) (0.343) (0.140)
Slone, Clay and 0.545 0.586 1.000 0.500 1.236 0.667 0.670
Glass (0.220) (0.186) (0.316) (0.433) (0.465) (0.349) (0.114)
Basic Metals 0.361 0.251 0.412 1.101 1.157 1.070 0.589
(0.763) (0.358) (0.299) (0.384) (0.813) (0.833) (0.181)
Mechanical 0.163 0.466 0.426 1.323 0.154 1.208 0.470
Equipment (0.704) (0.231) (0.447) (0.828) (0.405) (0.678) (0.168)
Prec.-Weighted 0.458 0.526 0.632 0.623 0.645 0.621 0.569
Average (0.146) (0.102) (0.138) (0.186) (0.190) (0.152) (0.058)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3 reports the estimated y coefficients, which capture the responsiveness of 
productivity growth in an industry to value added growth in the same industry in other 
countries (holding constant value added in the rest of the manufacturing sector of that 
particular country). The industries that appear most sensitive to “supply” conditions, as 
captured by the growth of value added in the same industry in other countries, are the 
chemicals and the non-metallic minerals industries. The industries that appear least sensitive 




























































































Tab l e  4
P a r t i a l  R 2 ’s o f  O r t h o g o n a l  C o u n t r y  and I n d u s t r y  E f f e c t s  as 
D e te r m in a n ts  of  Va lue  Added per  Man-Hour  Growth
USA Peu Eta fisi i t o UK Average Ratio
Food Country 0.031 0.011 0.027 0.003 0.058 0.005 0.035 0 981
Industry 0.010 0.050 0.098 0.090 0.028 0.007 0 036
Textiles Country 0.001 0.016 0.104 0.055 0.001 0.108 0.052 1.191
Industry 0.024 0.034 0.104 0.022 0.022 0.063 0.043
Paper Country 0 003 0.087 0.021 0.013 0.009 0.139 0.049 0.536
Industry 0.085 0.174 0.001 0.034 0.184 0.098 0 092
Chemicals Country 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.165 0.067 0.034 0.074 0.580
Industry 0.077 0.271 0.295 0.000 0.137 0.190 0.127
Stone, Clay Country 0.113 0.121 0.082 0.080 0.025 0.085 0.075 0.438
and Glass Industry 0.182 0.212 0.208 0.049 0.267 0.112 0.170
Basic Country 0.086 0.023 0.051 0.003 0.005 0.013 0.026 0.194
Metals Industry 0.014 0.043 0.146 0.373 0.15S 0.108 0.135
Mechanical Country 0.175 0.084 0.018 0.027 0.030 0.031 0.070 0.652
Equipment Industry 0.004 0.234 0.076 0.179 0.012 0.166 0.107
Average Country 0.073 0.039 0.048 0.071 0.040 0.049 0.050 0.435
Industry 0.039 0.160 0.130 0.114 0.141 0.116 0.115
Ratio 1.872 0.244 0.369 0.623 0.284 0.422
Table 4 shows that the fraction of the variance in productivity accounted for by 
orthogonal nation-specific effects is much smaller than the fraction of the variance in value 
added explained by orthogonal nation-specific effects in table 1. Orthogonal nation-specific 
effects account for 4.98 percent of variance, including the variance ‘explained’ for industries 
which have negative estimated coefficients on value added in other industries. In each 
country it is far lower than the partial for the regressions in Waldmann (1991), with value 
added as the dependent variable. Table 4 also shows that the fraction of total variance in 




























































































somewhat higher than the fraction of the variance of value added accounted for by orthogonal 
industry effects in Waldmann (1991). Since employment in different industries is highly 
correlated, this finding that the nation effects on labor productivity are smaller than nation 
effects on value added is not unexpected.
Omitted Variable Bias
The presence of significant nation effects on labor productivity would appear to be 
evidence in favor of labor hoarding-based, job hoarding-based, or increasing returns to scale- 
based interpretations of procyclical labor productivity. Increased aggregate demand causes 
increased labor productivity, even controlling for cost and supply shocks. But before the 
orthogonal nation-specific effects can be interpreted as effects of aggregate demand, more 
sophisticated attempts to control for supply shocks are desirable. We examined three possible 
sets of omitted variables.
The first avenue of approach was that perhaps the rate of productivity growth in the 
nations of the sample shifts over time. A linear trend was added to the regressions which— 
since the dependent variable is a growth rate—corresponds to allowing for quadratic trend in 
the level of productivity. Such a trend has almost no effect on the estimated P coefficients on 
national value added in the rest of manufacturing. For example, the seemingly-unrelated- 
regressions estimated P coefficient for the United States is 0.032 instead of 0.037, and the 
summary precision-weighted average of the coefficients on national manufacturing remains 
0.127 (results not shown).
The second avenue was to try to control explicitly for the oil shocks of the 1970’s. 
Controlling for average productivity growth in the same industry in different countries is to 
some degree a control for the effects of the oil shocks of the 1970’s. But oil shocks may well 
have had different effects on different nation—on oil exporters such as England and Norway, 
for example. Since the complex pattern of effects of the oil shocks on an industry may not 
have been captured by a single y coefficient, we reestimated the productivity regressions 
including as additional explanatory variables the change and the lagged change in the price of 




























































































effect on the estimated |J coefficients. The summary precision-weighted average of the 
seemingly-unrelated-regressions coefficients on national value added in the rest of 
manufacturing increases from 0.127 to 0.128 (results not shown).
The third avenue considered was to include estimates of the capital stock in order to 
examine the procyclicality not of labor productivity but of total factor productivity—the 
Solow residual. Up to this point the Solow residual has been neglected for three reasons. 
First, the data set does not contain adequate data on shares of labor and capital in pre-tax 
value added; second, OECD studies based on the data warn that reported factor shares are 
unreliable (see Meyer-zu-Schlochtem, 1988).17 Third, Solow residuals exhibit spurious 
cyclicality if firms possess market power (Hall, 1986 and 1988).18
To investigate whether the omission of capital stock variables was biasing our results, 
we assumed that the elasticity of value added with respect to labor and capital was constant 
and imposed constant returns to scale to arrive at a Cobb-Douglas production function in 
which value added per man-hour is a function also of the capital/labor ratio.19 This led to 
equation 2:
(2) A{log(Y/Nim)) = cni +Pnl[A(log(Ynt-Yint))]+7nl[A(l0g(Y/Ni(.n)t))] + 
8in[A(log(Kim/Eint) ) ]+ eim
where K stands for the real capital stock, and E for the level of employment.20
17In fact, such studies throw away the reported factor share data and instead arbitrarily assume that 
the share of labor is 75%.
'«A corrected Solow residual could be constructed under the assumption that the ratio of price to 
marginal cost is constant, but there is little reason to believe this assumption (see Domowitz, 
Hubbard, and Petersen,1988).
19 Data on capital stocks are not available for Finland. However, the absence of reliable average hours 
data for Finland makes its inclusion impossible in any event. Data on capital stocks in Norway in the 
1960's also do not exist in the data set, reducing the number of countries in the sample to five.
20The ratio of capital per worker, rather than the ratio of capital per man-hour is used on the 
assumption that the work week of capital is the same as work week of workers. Under the alternative 
assumption that the work week of capital is fixed and thus that the appropriate capital/labor ratio is 
capital divided by hours worked, the estimated elasticity of value added with respect to capital is 




























































































Tab le  5
V a lu e  Added pe r  Man Hour Regressed on G r o w t h  o f  the  Res t  of  
M a n u f a c t u r i n g ,  on In d u s t r y  G r o w t h  In O t h e r  C o u n t r i e s ,  and on 
the C a p l t a l / L a b o r  Ra t io
USA Peu Eta tel JJ&
p 0.247 0.094 0.193 0.062 0.174
(0.080) (0.054) (0.094) (0.072) (0.045)
y 0.518 0.428 0.581 0.781 0.284
(0.144) (0.105) (0.142) (0.181) (0.119)
8 0.245 0.272 -0.025 0.325 0.795
(0.143) (0.087) (0.182) (0.144) (0.091)
Averane
P estimated by SUR 0.089 0.045 0.286 0.000 0.242 0.133
(0.089) (0.074) (0.086) (0.075) (0 066) (0 034)
Food Textiles Paper Chemicals Stone... Metals Equipment
P -0.010 0.270 0.261 0.448 0.373 0.390 0.216
(0.038) (0.088) (0.083) (0.107) (0.085) (0.161) (0.103)
tr 0.097 0.421 0.527 0.665 0.645 0.608 0.455
(0.135) (0.185) (0.189) (0.137) (0.126) (0.176) (0.186)
8 0.777 0.371 0.098 0.484 0.206 0.478 0.330
(0.110) (0.130) (0.171) (0.150) (0.109) (0.168) (0.162)
Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions control tor average productivity growth in the eame industry in other 
countries.
The results of regressions including the capital/labor ratio were disappointing. Summary 
P, y, and 6 coefficients for nations and industries are reported in table 5. The estimated 
coefficients on the capital/labor ratio are often implausible: for 13 of 35 underlying 
regressions, the coefficient on the capital/labor ratio is negative. The precision-weighted 
average coefficient is negative for France; for England the average coefficient is enormous— 




























































































We ascribe these disappointing results to the fact that the variance of changes in capital 
stocks is low, and so changes in the capital/labor ratio are nearly the negative of changes in 
employment.21 This interpretation is supported by the rinding of similar results when the 
capital/labor ratio is replaced by 1/employment (results not shown): the coefficients on 
1/employment are in fact greater than the coefficients on the capital labor ratio. We conclude 
that the OECD estimates of capital are not useful in attempting to analyze labor productivity 
over the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s.22
Each of the different sets of regressions run is vulnerable to criticism based on the 
omission of a potential supply side effect. The similarity of results that devote different 
degrees of effort to controlling for such effects in the specifications we have tried, together 
with the finding that all regressions show significant nation effects, suggests that these 
criticisms are not serious. The inclusion of valid supply-side variables should reduce 
estimated nation effects even if the supply-side variables are relatively poor proxies. This 
does not take place. We are confident that the estimated association of value added and 
productivity shows that increased demand leads to increased labor productivity.
Instrumental Variables Estimates o f Procyclical Labor Productivity
An appropriate measure of the magnitude of demand-driven productivity changes in a 
given industry is the elasticity of hours worked with respect to value added. In table 6, we 
estimate this elasticity by instrumenting the demand for each industry’s value added
21 In this case, the large coefficient estimated for England perhaps reflects the fact that the 
capital/labor ratio is picking up the large negative disturbance to employment following the 
accession of Margaret Thatcher (Layard and Nickell, 1989). There was a large drop in English 
manufacturing employment in 1982. This huge drop in employment corresponds to a huge increse in 
the measured capital/ labor ratio, and to a huge increase in production per man-hour. Such an 
increase can be interpreted as showing that employment follows value added with a lag due to job 
hoarding, or that by 1983 Thatcher had finally terrorized the unions enough that she and private 
firms could fire workers in droves (see Bertola and Bentolila, 1987). Neither explanation has anything 
to do with the effect the capital/labor ratio is supposed to capture—that workers can produce more 
value added working with machines than without them.
^ I t  is reassuring to note that the inclusion of the capital/labor ratio does not change the measured 
cyclicality of labor productivity enormously. Labor productivity remains procyclical controlling for 
growth in the same industry in other countries when the capital/labor or the 1/labor ratios are 




























































































by the growth of manufacturing value added in the same country outside that industry. The 
estimates reflect not only long run elasticities of hours with respect to value added, but also 
the effects of labor or job hoarding, which should reduce the elasticity of hours worked with 
respect to value added.
Tab le  6
E l a s t i c i t y  of  Hours Worked  w i t h  R es pe c t  to V a lu e  Added,  Not  
Co nt ro l l i ng  f o r  Indus t ry  E f f e c t s
Precision-Weighted
USA Deu Eifl B&l Nor UK Average
Food 1.747 1.069 0.265 1.016 0.433 0.907 0.722
(1.562) (0.313) (0.346) (0.621) (0.289) (0.271) (0.133)
Textiles 0.955 1.076 0.697 0.725 1.040 0.719 0.810
(0.159) (0.239) (0.158) (0.201) (0.514) (0.153) (0.075)
Paper 0.661 0.646 0.731 1.048 0.514 0.270 0.480
(0.135) (0.103) (0.282) (0.372) (0.330) (0.093) (0.055)
Chemicals 0.826 0.648 0.768 0.343 0.343 0.501 0.536
(0.172) (0.149) (0.161) (0.102) (0.189) (0.116) (0.055)
Stone, Clay 0.729 0.615 0.451 0.492 0.744 0.551 0.579
and Glass (0.082) (0.081) (0.085) (0.120) (0.372) (0.111) (0039)
Basic 0.561 0.702 1.128 0.553 0.982 0.519 0.574
Metals (0.068) (0.1661 (0.326) (0.231) (1.092) (0.183) (0.056)
Mechanical 0.729 0.704 0.109 0.678 0.394 0.529 0.692













Standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions do not include the average growth of value added or ol hours worked in the same industry in dillerent 
countries.
In table 6 no additional regressors are included to control for industry-specific shocks. 
The precision-weighted average of the estimated elasticities ranges from 0.480 for Norway to 
0.683 for Germany. In Germany a one-percent increase in value added corresponds to a 0.68 
percent increase in hours worked. Even for Germany, the nation with the highest value, the 
precision-weighted average coefficient is significantly less than one—implying that labor 
productivity is procyclical. The U.S. has the second highest average elasticity, noticeably 




























































































fact that total hours adjust the same amount in the United States and Germany confirms the 
results of Abraham and Houseman (1989).23
Tab le  7
E l a s t i c i t y  o f  H our s  W o r k e d  w i t h  R e s p e c t  to  V a l u e  Added,  
C on t r o l l i ng  f o r  Indu s t ry  E f f e c t s
USA Peu Eia Bfil U K UK
Precision-Weighted 
Average
Food 2.155 1.057 -0.016 0.365 0.534 0.607 0.181
(3.338) (0.518) (0.169) (0.591) (0-678) (0.440) (0.143)
Textiles 1.036 0.892 0.406 0.674 4.334 0.552 0.634
(0.246) (0.306) (0.197) (0.364) (13.114) (0.145) (0.096)
Paper 0.643 0.688 0.791 0.771 0.943 0.524 0.672
(0.396) (0.143) (0.538) (1.752) (1.289) (0.242) (0.114)
Chemicals 0.859 2.481 2.145 0.199 0.344 0.428 0.360
(0.277) (1.748) (1.205) (0.130) (0.413) (0.244) (0.102)
Stone, Clay, and 0705 0.764 0.966 0.312 1.440 0.420 0.653
Glass (0.083) (0.162) (0.302) (0.225) (1.278) (0.162) (0.063)
Basic Metals 0.637 -1.221 -6.438 1.098 1.873 0.711 0.672
(0.260) (1.417) (43.197) (0.615) (5.183) (0.367) (0.199)
Mechanical 0.646 0.809 1.393 0.656 0.305 0.390 0.650
Equipment (0.129) (0.290) (1.025) (0.502) (0.527) (0.481) (0.109)
Prec.-Weighted 0.720 0.754 0.338 0.310 0.451 0.502 0.578
Average (0.063) (0.094) (0.114) (0.102) (0.278) (0.086) (0.038)
St andard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include the average growth ol value added and of hours worked in the same industry in different 
countries.
Table 7 adds the average change in value added and in hours worked in the same 
industry in other countries as additional regressors to control for supply shocks. With these 
variables included, estimated elasticities differ more across countries: removing averages 
highlights national differences. All precision-weighted national averages of elasticities are 
significantly less than one. Germany continues to exhibit the highest average estimated 
elasticity at 0.754, closely followed by the U.S. at 0.720. The lowest precision-weighted 
national elasticity is for Belgium at 0.310. Such elasticities also suggest that labor 
productivity is procyclical after controlling for cross-national supply shocks.
23The much lower elasticities estimated for other European countries than Germany suggest that, as 
Abraham and Houseman note, their results may have been caused in part by the fact that Germany 




























































































Tab le  8
E l a s t i c i t y  o f  E m p l o y m e n t  w i t h  R e s p e c t  to  V a l u e  Add ed ,  















































































































































St andard errors in parentheses.
Regressions include the average growth of value added and of employment in the same industry in different countries. 
Sample 1970-64 for basic metals and mechanical equipment industries. Sample 1963-84 for other industhes.
Table 8 reports national average coefficients from instrumental variables regressions of 
the elasticity not of man-hours but of employment with respect to value added, controlling 
for average growth of employment and value added in the same industry in other countries.24 
The U.S. has a markedly greater precision-weighted average estimated elasticity than most 
European countries: 0.591. For five of the six European countries the estimate is on the order 
of 0.3 or smaller: Finland is the exception.25
24Results are similar without the controls.
25The exception is Finland, with a average estimated elasticity of 0.559. One possible problem with 
this result is that changes average hours worked reflect not only the adjustment of hours worked by 
normally full time workers, but also changes in the proportion of full and part time workers. The 
result may simply show that in the U.S. part time work is more cyclical than in Europe and so 




























































































This is of interest: labor and job hoarding work to prevent layoffs, not necessarily to 
keep hours unchanged. The differing elasticities suggest that there may be some returns to 
pursuing institution-based explanations of procyclical productivity. The next section 
correlates the degree of procyclical productivity with unemployment. It argues that 
procyclical productivity is driven by institutional interactions of workers and firms, and not 
by technological interactions of workers and machines.
IV. P r oc yc l i c a l  P r o d u c t iv i t y  and the Unemployment  Rate
The previous section establishes a presumption that a component of procyclical 
productivity is independent of supply-side shocks and is, instead, a consequence of shifts in 
demand. There are at least three interpretations of how such demand-driven procyclical 
productivity comes about. First, there may be increasing returns. Second, firms may hoard 
labor. Third, workers may hoard jobs.
Each interpretation leads to its own predictions of the likely cross-country pattern of 
procyclical productivity, and of the shifts over time in the cyclicality of productivity. “Job 
hoarding” by workers is likely to show itself most clearly in European countries, which have 
stronger labor movements and job protection legislation than the United States (see Cross, 
1985; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Clark, 1988; and Lazear, 1990).
Section III above noted that the United States shows more adjustment of employment to 
shifts in demand than does Europe. It is difficult to see how increasing returns could produce 
such a pattern: European industry would have to have more sharply increasing returns than 
U.S. industry. It seems more straightforward to conclude that the European labor market has 




























































































The cross-country pattern alone does not tell us whether procyclical productivity arises 
because of hiring costs—firms hoarding workers because they fear they will not find 
personnel when the economy recovers—of because of firing costs—workers hoarding jobs 
because their positions in the labor market are valuable assets in which they have quasi­
property rights.
Distinguishing Between Labor Hoarding and Job Hoarding
More information on the relative importance of labor hoarding, job hoarding, and 
increasing returns can be gained by looking at shifts in the cyclicality of labor productivity 
within each country. Increasing returns suggests no link between procyclical productivity and 
macroeconomic variables. But if labor hoarding is the cause of procyclical productivity, then 
productivity will be less cyclical in periods of high unemployment. In a time of high 
unemployment firms need not fear that workers will find new jobs and be unavailable when 
business picks up. Firms are therefore more likely to use temporary layoffs to manage their 
costs when the unemployment rate is chronically high.
By contrast, if workers resist layoffs—and “hoard” their jobs—because they are well 
organized or because of employment protection legislation, labor productivity will be more 
procyclical when unemployment is high. At a low unemployment rate quits will be sufficient 
for firms wishing to reduce work forces to do so by attrition. Unions are unlikely to spend 
political capital resisting layoffs when members can easily find other good jobs.
In the United States, labor productivity is less cyclical in unionized industries (Medoff, 
1979; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). This suggests that labor hoarding is more important than 
job hoarding: if workers resisted layoffs, they would be more able to do so in highly 
unionized industries. If job hoarding were an important cause of U.S. procyclical 
productivity, labor productivity would be more cyclical in highly unionized industries. This 
cross-sectional pattern leads to the prediction that labor productivity will be less procyclical 




























































































By contrast, high unemployment should increase the procyclicality of productivity in 
Europe. In Europe, powerful union movements and legal restrictions on layoffs are likely to 
make job hoarding important. When unemployment is high workers are less likely to quit. 
And workers are more likely to resist layoffs when unemployment is high and makes their 
jobs valuable property.26
In either case, a significant effect of unemployment on the cyclicality of labor 
productivity is evidence that hiring and firing costs are among the causes of procyclical 
productivity. The absence of an effect would be evidence that the cause may be technological 
change, and increasing returns.
Estimating the Effect of Unemployment on the Procyclicality o f Productivity
The interaction of value added growth and the unemployment rate was added to the 
independent variables of equation 1, giving equation 3:
(3) A{log(Y/Nim)) =cni+ pni[A{log(Ynt-Yint)}]+Yni[A(log(Y/Ni(.n)t))] +
^l^n[t-X]'  Avg(Unt)][A{l°g(YnfY ^t)J- Avg(A{log(Yn,-Yjnt)})] + £jnt
where Un[t-X] *s t*ie unemployment rate in nation n lagged X years. We estimate equation 3 
for X equal to 1 and 2—with value added growth in the rest of manufacturing interacted with 
unemployment lagged one and two years. We lag unemployment one year to reduce 
correlations beween this period’s disturbance and this period’s unemployment rate. We lag 
unemployment two years for two reasons. First, since all data are averages over a year of 
continuous-time processes, a two-year lag is needed to completely purge the correlation with 
current disturbance terms.
26Just as anticipated future hiring costs may prevent layoffs during recessions, anticipated firing costs 
may reduce hiring during expansions. An extensive literature discusses the possibility that increased 
unemployment may have caused the constraints on layoffs in Europe to become binding (see 
Blanchard and Summers, 1986 and 1988; Bertola and Bentolila, 1990; KrugTnan, 1988; Freeman, 1988). 
It has been noted that aggregate employment and unemployment fluctuations have become more 
persistent in Europe in the 1980's (Blanchard and Summers). It is important to learn if this reflects 





























































































Second, use of unemployment lagged two years serves as a specification check: we 
believe that the degree of procyclical productivity changes relatively slowly, as workers’ and 
firms’ perceptions of the ease of finding new jobs or new workers shifts. If results differed 
depending on the exact lag of unemployment, we would no longer believe our specification.
Tab le  9
I n t e r a c t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  V a l u e  A d d e d  G r o w t h  and  
U n e m p lo y m e n t ,  w i t h  In d u s t r y  V a lu e  Added p e r  M a n - H o u r  as the  
Dependent  V a r ia b le
Difference between 
Europe- USAandEurope-
USA Peu Era Bfil Nor UK Pooled Pooled
Five Industries—Six Countries
Unemployment -0.104 0.173 0.030 0.055 0.092 0.024 0.022 0.127
Lagged 1 Year (0.042) (0.049) (0.041) (0.047) (0.347) (0.028) (0.019) (0.047)
Unemployment -0.088 0.206 0.039 0.039 0.025 0.048 0.033 0.121
Lagged 2 Years (0.048) (0.063) (0.044) (0.053) (0.484) (0.027) (0.020) (0.052)
Seven Industries—Four Countries
Unemployment 0.071 0.145 0.270 0.049 0.077 0.148
Lagged 1 Year (0.036) (0.038) (0.230) (0.027) (0.022) (0.042)
Unemployment 0.056 0.190 0.036 0.070 0.092 0.148
Lagged 2 years (0.040) (0.045) (0.325) (0.022) (0.020) (0.044)
In equation 3, averages are taken over 1963 - 1984, Average unemployment and rates of 
value added growth in the rest of manufacturing were subtracted in the second line of 
equation 3 to make the estimates of (1 and y comparable to those estimated for equation 1 27. 
For each country, the system of equation 3 for the five industries food, textiles, paper, 
chemicals, and non-metallic minerals was estimated by seemingly-unrelated-regressions 
procedures, restricting p to be the same across industries.28 For those four nations with data 
available on employment in metals and equipment in the 1960’s, the system was estimated 
for all seven industries as well, restricting p to be the same across industries.
27 This also reduces bias in estimates of p caused by correlation between stochastic trends in 
unemployment and in productivity. Below we report estimates of p whith the unemployment rate is 
included in the regression which indicate that any remaining bias is small.
2®Similar results were obtained by estimating equation 3 by OLS for these industries, and for basic 





























































































The first set of estimated p interaction coefficients are presented in table 9. For each 
country-industry pair, it presents the values of the interaction coefficients from regressions of 
the growth of value added per hour worked on value added growth in other industries in that 
nation, the average of value added growth in the same industry in other nations, and the 
interaction of the unemployment rate level with national value added growth. For the United 
States the interaction term is negative and significant—a coefficient in the first line of -0.104 
with a standard error of 0.042, although the coefficient is weaker in subsequent lines. This 
provides some evidence suggesting that labor hoarding is a dominant cause of U.S. 
procyclical productivity.
For Germany, the interaction is positive and significant, suggesting that job hoarding is a 
predominant cause of procyclical productivity and is more prevalent during period of 
chronically high unemployment. For Britain the interaction is positive, but its significance is 
borderline and changes from specification to specification.
For France and Belgium, the coefficient is negative and insignificant. For Norway, it is 
far from significant with a huge standard error, and its sign depends on the specification. The 
failure of a pattern to emerge for the small open economies of Norway and Belgium is not 
unexpected. The interaction term is only identified by the orthogonal nation-specific shock to 
aggregate demand, and these small open economies possess only small nation-specific 
movements in total manufacturing value added.29 The failure of a pattern to emerge for 
France is disappointing, for France is large and has pursued independentmacroeconomic 
policies over the past third of a century. We expected to see stronger results.
29The magnitude, however, of the Norwegian interaction coefficient is deserving of explanation. We 
tentatively ascribe the high magnitude to the fact that the Norwegian unemployment rate exhibits a 
very small rise in the 1970's, and is therefore highly collinear with a post-North Sea oil discovery 
dummy variable. Under this interpretation, the coefficient is capturing the fact that Norwegian 
productivity became much more sensitive to the level of production in Norway after the discovery of 
North Sea oil. If this interpretation is correct, the coefficient carries little information about the 




























































































However, the difference between the interaction coefficients estimated for the United 
States and that estimated for a pooled sample of European countries is large and highly 
significant. Procylical productivity is weaker in the United States when unemployment is 
high, but it is not weaker in Europe. It is difficult to argue that the same “labor hoarding” that 
appears to generate procyclical productivity in the U.S. generates it in Europe as well.
Tab le  10
I n t e r a c t ton C o e f f l c t e n t s  o f  V a l u e  A d d e d G r o w t h  and
U n e m p l o y m e n t , w i t h In d u s t r y V a lu e Added pe r W o r k e r  as the
Dependent  V a r i ab le
Difference between
Europe- US & Europe-
USA Deu Eia fid tte UK Eia Pooted Pooled
Five Industries—Seven Countries
Unemployment -0.105 0.158 0.002 0.020 0.035 0.017 0.045 0.033 0.138
Lagged 1 Year (0.048) (0.054) (0.037) (0.043) (0.312) (0.030) (0.052) (0.018) (0.051)
Unemployment -0.099 0.093 -0.020 0.026 0.327 0.041 0.026 0.026 0.125
Lagged 2 Years (0.054) (0.072) (0.040) (0.048) (0.438) (0.031) (0.065) (0.020) (0.057)
Seven Industries—Five Countries
Unemployment -0.075 0.144 -0.206 0.051 0.022 0.068 0.143
Lagged 1 Year (0.037) (0.045) (0.225) (0.026) (0.041) (0.026) (0.045)
Unemployment -0.069 0.083 0.365 0.067 0.017 0.073 0.142
Lagged 2 years (0.041) (0.059) (0.308) (0.023) (0.051) (0.020) (0.045)
The dependent variable in equation 3 is production per man-hour. Since hiring and firing 
costs are likely to depend on the change not in man-hours but in employment, it is interesting 
to compare the behavior of production per worker with the behavior of production per man­
hour.30 Similarity in coefficients would suggest that table 9 is not simply due to changes in 
the labor force, or differences in the reporting of hours worked.
■^Ideally, one would want to examine labor hoarding by examining hours worked by workers who 
normally work lull time—thus obtaining a more direct measure of overtime and slack time hours. As 
noted above, differences between countries in the cyclicality of production per worker can reflect 
differences in the cyclicality of part time work. Changes over time within a country also reflect, 




























































































Equation 3 was thus re-estimated replacing value added per man-hour by value added 
per worker. Table 10 reports the results, which are indeed similar to those reported in table 9. 
The procyclicality of value added per worker undergoes the same shifts with changing 
unemployment as does the procyclicality of value added per man hour. The interaction term 
is significantly negative only for the U.S, for which it is virtually unchanged: -0.105. For 
Germany, the coefficient is reduced to 0.158 from 0.173; for Britain the coefficient decreases 
to 0.017 in the first line of the table. The coefficients of Belgium, France, and Norway remain 
insignificant and negative.31
Errors in and Omissions of Variables
Controlling for average productivity growth in the same industry in different countries 
has the important advantage of controlling for supply shocks. But from a Keynesian 
standpoint it would be disturbing if results were substantially changed if the international 
average growth rates of value added in individual industries were excluded from the list of 
independent variables. It is also possible that the average of growth in the same industry in 
other countries is not an appropriate measure of supply and cost shocks: perhaps nation- 
specific shocks—like the discovery of North Sea oil—contaminate the variable the results for 
other countries. To the extent that nation-specific industry value added movements reflect the 
discovery of a nation-specific shocks like the discovery of North Sea oil for Norway, the 
average across nations of value added growth in an industry is a poor measure of true supply 
shocks.
These considerations led us to repeat the interaction regressions without controlling for 
average growth in the same industry in other countries, as shown in equation 4:
(4) A|log(Y/Nim)) =cni+ pm[A(log(Ynt-Yim))]+
W n lt- \ )  * Avg(Unt)][A{log(Ym-Yint)}- Avg(A{log(Ym-Yint)})] + 6^ ,
31 Finland can be included in regressions using value added per worker because average hours are 
not needed. Finland possesses a positive coefficient on the interaction term 0.093 with a standard 
error of 0.0483. The large standard error presumably reflects the difficulty of identifying national 




























































































E xcept for N orw ay itse lf , the interaction terms w ere virtually unchanged, as table 11 sh ow s.
Tab le  1 I
I n t e r a c t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  V a l u e  A d d e d  G r o w t h  and  
U n e m p lo y m e n t ,  w i t h  In d u s t r y  Va lue  Added per  M a n - H o u r  as the  
Dependent  Va r i a b le ,  No Indust ry  Cont ro ls
Difference between 
Europe- USA and Europe-
USA Peu Eu Bfil Nor UK Pooled Pooled
Five Industries—Six Countries
Unemployment -0.122 0.139 •0.028 -0.009 ■0.378 0.039 0.030 0.151
Lagged! Year (0.042) (0.057) (0.054) (0.041) (0.376) (0.029) (0.020) (0.047)
Unempk>ymen! -0.115 0.168 -0.041 -0.002 -0.632 0.057 0.042 0.157
Lagged 2 Years (0.047) (0.072) (0.058) (0.047) (0.530) (0.026) (0.020) (0.051)
Seven. Industries— Four Countries
Unemployment -0.090 0.087 -0.246 0.047 0.053 0.143
Lagged 1 Year (0.035) (0.049) (0.238) (0.027) (0.024) (0.042)
Unemployment -0.083 0.124 -0.169 0.064 0.071 0.154
Lagged 2 years (0.038) (0.058) (0.322) (0.024) (0.022) (0.044)
Omitted variables might corrupt our results. Productivity might be more cyclical in 
Germany and Europe when unemployment is high simply because both the unemployment 
rate and the cyclicality of labor productivity have increased for other reasons. It is easy to see 
how the cyclicality of labor productivity could have a positive trend if, say, the ratio of 
administrative to production workers increases over time. Given the time pattern of European 
unemployment, the interaction terms in the regressions come close to comparing the 
cyclicality of labor productivity in the later half of to the cyclicality in the earlier half of the 
sample.
While the use of a disaggregated dependent variable—of sector-specific value added— 
gives greater precision, it does not increase the ability to discriminate between increased 
unemployment and the effect of time. In the case of the United States, the time pattern of 
unemployment makes it correlated with lagged oil shocks; lagged oil shocks might have 
reduced the cyclicality of labor productivity.





























































































In each case it is possible in principle to control for omitted variable bias by including an 
additional independent variable: the omitted variable interacted with the growth in 
manufacturing value added. But such regressions are likely to lack power.
We use an alternative procedure. If German unemployment is standing in for an omitted 
variable, this omitted variable should also have been in operation in other countries. If a 
secular increase in the amount of overhead labor is making productivity more procyclical and 
if the German unemployment rate is correlated with this omitted variable, than a regression 
of productivity growth in an American industry on the growth of value added in the rest of 
American manufacturing and the interaction with German unemployment should produce the 
same, positive, interaction coefficient.
T ab le  12
I n t e r a c t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  of  V a lu e  Added G r o w t h  and G e r m a n  
U n e m p lo y m e n t ,  w i t h  In d u s t r y  V a lu e  Added per  Man Hour  as the  
Dependent  Va r i a b le
Difference between 
Europe- USA and Europe-
USA Deu E a Bel Nor UK Pooled Pooled
five Industries—S u Countries
Unemployment -0.105 0.139 0.002 0.008 -0.058 0.064 0.052 0.157
Lagged 1 Year (0.029) (0.057) (0.062) (0.073) (0.092) (0.038) (0.025) (0.039)
Unemployment -0.122 0.168 0.047 0.033 -0.059 0.052 0.061 0.183
Lagged 2 Years (0.041) (0.072) (0.079) (0.066) (0.114) (0.038) (0.028) (0.049)
Seven Industries—Four Countries
Unemployment -0.086 0.087 -0.042 0.067 0.049 0.134
Lagged 1 Year (0.024) (0.049) (0.055) (0.035) (0.025) (0.035)
Unemployment -0.113 0.124 0.003 0.057 0.063 0.176
Lagged 2 years (0.032) (0.058) (0.066) (0.035) (0.028) (0.042)
But table 12 shows that interacting the growth of manufacturing value added in a 
country with the German unemployment rate rather than the national unemployment does not 
cause the interaction terms to mimic the German pattern. The coefficient drops for England, 





























































































These results do not suggest that the positive effect of German unemployment on the 
cyclicality of German labor productivity is due to the correlation of German unemployment 
and another factor causing increased cyclicality of labor productivity.32
One final errors-in-variables problem is somewhat subde, but easy to evaluate. The 
decomposition of productivity growth into trend and cycle would be difficult even if many 
more years of data are available. The regressions reported above do not reveal whether the 
interaction term reflects a change in the cyclicality of productivity, or simply reflect changes 
in the trend in productivity growth which happen to be correlated with changes in the average 
decade-to-decade level of the unemployment rate. A confident interpretation of the 
coefficient on the interaction term would require many more years of data with high and with 
low unemployment. 33
It is possible with available data to control for some obvious factors which could have 
changed both the trend of value added and of productivity. Inclusion of a time trend had very 
little effect; inclusion of the capital/labor ratio had little effect also (results not shown).
It is possible to control direcdy for changes in the trend of productivity and value added 
which happen to be correlated with decade-to-decade average unemployment levels by 
including unemployment itself in the regressions. Including the unemployment rate does not 
affect the interaction coefficients. As reported in table 13, the coefficient remains 
significantly negative in the U.S., and positive in Germany. The difference between pooled 
Europe and the U.S. remains large and significant.
32The analogous question can be asked about the negative coefficients on the interaction term found 
for the United States: perhaps they reflect the fact that U.S. unemployment is highly correlated with 
lagged oil shocks. If so, regressions of other countries' productivity growth on the interaction of their 
growth of the rest of manufacturing and the U n ite d  S ta tes unemployment rate should be negative.
However, when such regressions are estimated the interaction coefficient for Germany remains 
positive and significant (results not shown). The coefficient for England falls and is not significant, 
but remains positive. For other countries, coefficients remain insignificant and negative. The 
summary precision-weighted average coefficient on the interaction of U n ite d  S ta te s  unemployment 
and national rates of growth in the rest of manufacturing is positive; the opposite of what one would 
have expected according to the omitted variable-bias story.
33By removing the sample mean from the change in value added in manufacturing outside of 
industry I we have already attempted to avoid this problem while conserving degrees of freedom. 




























































































Tab l e  13
I n t e r a c t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  w i t h  t h e  L e v e l  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  
Added to the L is t  o f  Independent  V a r i ab le s
Difference between 
Europe- USA and Europe-
USA Peu Eta Bfil H ot UK Pooled Pooled
Five Industries—Six Countries
Unemployment -0.106 0.170 0.002 -0.061 0.127 0.021 0.035 0.142
Lagged 1 Year (0.0410 (0.051) (0.057) (0.060) (0.358) (0.031) (0.022) (0.046)
Unemployment -0.082 0.186 -0.033 -0.018 0.044 0.042 0.046 0.128
Lagged 2 Years (0.049) (0.067) (0.066) (0.077) (0.497) (0.033) (0026) (0.055)
Seven Industries—Four Countries
Unemployment 0.065 0.138 -0.389 0.029 0.064 0.129
Lagged t Year (0.035) (0.040) (0.246) (0.030) (0.024) (0.043)
Unemployment -0.052 0.162 0.164 0 064 0.085 0.136
Lagged 2 years (0.040) (0.047) (0.335) (0.024) (0.022) (0.046)
Assessment
None of the explorations and alternatives considered in the second half of this section 
shake the finding that the effect of unemployment on the cyclicality of productivity is 
different in the U.S. and in Europe. In the U.S., high unemployment is correlated with low 
cyclicality in productivity. This reinforces the cross-sectional evidence that labor hoarding by 
firms is an important component of procyclical productivity in the U.S. In Europe by 
contrast, the correlation between high unemployment and the cyclicality of labor productivity 
is positive or statistically insignificant. This suggest that the importance of job hoarding by 






























































































This paper has reported evidence that procyclical productivity is more than the 
consequence of supply-side shocks propagating through a standard real business cycle model. 
Such theories can account for a correlation of sectoral productivity growth with aggregate 
value added, and can—if cost shocks affect an intermediate input, like oil, necessary for 
production in many sectors—account for a correlation of sectoral productivity growth with 
aggregate productivity.
One explanation for procyclical productivity in response to shifts in demand 
uncorrelated with shifts in industry supply is that a firm receives surplus from keeping a 
stock of workers—and that a worker receives surplus from keeping an existing job. Thus 
labor “hoarding” by firms and job “hoarding” by workers underlies procyclical productivity. 
We have not built a model of the labor market. Nevertheless, the correlations make us 
optimistic about the utility of such models.
The differences across countries in the elasticities of labor input with respect to value 
added lend some support to the view that procyclical productivity reflects the strength of 
attachment of workers to jobs. In the United States, the response of employment to changes 
in value added appears much greater than in European countries. This difference might be 
caused by stronger union movements and employment protection legislation in Europe 
making “job hoarding” a more important factor in Europe. Real business cycle theories are 
silent on the causes of such cross-national differences.
Moreover, the level of the unemployment rate appears to have an effect on the degree to 
which productivity is procyclical. In the United States, higher unemployment levels 
correspond to significantly lower procyclicality. This might be explained in a model in which 
firms do not have to worry about permanently losing the ability to reemploy laid-off workers 
when unemployment is high. In Europe, however, increased unemployment does not seem to 
correspond to less procyclical labor productivity. British and German labor productivity 




























































































This difference between the effect of unemployment on the cyclicality of productivity 
might be accounted for by the greater ability of European workers to resist layoffs, and their 
determinadon to do so in times of high unemployment, in a model in which labor market 
institutions had effects on the organization and level of real production. By contrast, it is 
difficult to think how to begin to construct an explanation of this cross-Atlantic pattern based 
on supply shocks or on increasing returns to scale. The pattern suggests that it is worth 
investigating whether procyclical productivity arises from institutionally-influenced hiring 
and firing costs, and reflects the relationship between workers and firms—and not the 
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